La dénonciation tardive d'un vice caché qui empêche la partie défenderesse d'analyser la situation et de retenir les services d'un expert lui cause un préjudice réel et justifie le rejet du recours

par Karim Renno
Renno Vathilakis Inc.

En mars 2014, nous avions attiré votre attention sur la décision phare de la Cour d'appel dans Claude Joyal Inc. c.  CNH Canada Inc. (2014 QCCA 588) qui posait le principe voulant que l'absence de dénonciation du vice caché conformément à l'article 1739 C.c.Q. ne justifie le rejet d'un recours que si elle cause un préjudice réel à la partie défenderesse. Dans sa décision très récente de Cvesper c. Melatti (2023 QCCA 1545), la Cour d'appel vient spécifier que l'absence de dénonciation qui empêche la partie défenderesse d'analyser la situation et retenir les services d'un expert constitue - prima facie - un préjudice réel et qu'il reviendra à la partie demanderesse d'établir l'absence de préjudice.

Dans cette affaire, la Cour est saisie d'un pourvoi à l'encontre d'un jugement de première instance qui a accueilli le recours en vices cachés de l'Intimé suite à la découverte d'un réservoir d'huile souterain. 

Même si l'Intimé a retiré le réservoir et procédé aux travaux correctifs avant de dénoncer le vice conformément à l'article 1739 C.c.Q., la juge de première instance n'a pas retenu l'absence de dénonciation comme moyen de défense au motif que les Appelants avaient clairement indiqué qu'ils ne se consideraient pas responsables ne connaissant pas l'existence de ce réservoir et qu'ils n'avaient donc pas subi de préjudice réel de l'absence de dénonciation.

Une formation unanime de la Cour d'appel composée des Honorables juges Bich, Cotnam et Kalichman vient renverser cette décision. La Cour indique que l'impossibilité pour une partie défenderesse d'analyser la situation et retenir les services d'un expert en raison d'une dénonciation tardive constitue prima facie un préjudice, et qu'il revenait alors à l'Intimé de prouver absence de préjudice (ce qu'il n'a pas fait) :

[24] It is clear from this chronology that the Appellants were only informed of the discovery of the tank and the contamination after the remedial work had been completed. 

[25] The trial judge acknowledges this fact, but concludes that the Appellants did not suffer any real prejudice:

[48] If there was any delay in the denunciation, there was clearly no prejudice to the Defendants as they showed then, and now, no interest or belief that they needed to investigate or intervene on this matter. Defendants maintained from the beginning that they have no responsibility whatsoever with regards to the underground tank and soil contamination. They cannot fault the Buyer for having allegedly notified them too late or proceeding too quickly with the decontamination.

[49] The Court notes that by doing so, Mr. Melatti avoided delaying the construction of his residence, and potentially incur additional delays and costs as a result.

[50] The Court of Appeal has already stated that a default in notification, if it exists, must lead to a real prejudice to the seller. There is no such prejudice here.

[26] In the Court’s view, this conclusion is unsupported by the evidence. The trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error in concluding that the Appellants had suffered no real prejudice because they showed a lack of interest in investigating or intervening in the matter. With respect, the judge failed to take into account the fact that by the time the Appellants were informed of the situation, they were presented with a “fait accompli” as the remedial work had been completed and the foundations of the residence had even been poured. In the specific circumstances of this case, there was nothing for them to investigate. This was not a situation in which the seller denied liability or formally refused to assess the problem when it was still possible to do so. 

[27] Both Canada Inc. and the Appellants were never given the opportunity to examine the oil tank, assess the extent of the contamination, evaluate the options for remediation or control the costs. This situation is exactly what article 1739 CCQ purports to prevent. 

[28] This case is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Joyal where the property, purchased from a professional seller who was presumed to have knowledge of the defect, was destroyed and therefore could not be examined for a reason that had nothing to do with the buyer. Here, the Respondent decided to pursue the excavation work despite the fact that no notice had been given. 

[29] Furthermore, the remedial work was not urgent. The soil had apparently been contaminated for years. Other than the fact that the Respondent did not want to delay his construction project any further, there was no reason why he could not have given a reasonable delay to Canada Inc. and the Appellants to assess the situation and possibly retain expert advice. 

[30] The simple fact of denying them this possibility establishes, prima facie, the existence of a prejudice. The Respondent had the burden of proving that the Appellants would have been in the same situation had a timely notice been given. 

[31] Such a demonstration was not made. Although the remediation work was done under the supervision of a professional consultant, there is little evidence pertaining to the situation on the site. The few photos taken during the work, including one poor quality picture of the tank, do not show the extent of the contamination nor the progression of the decontamination work. The Appellants cannot ascertain if the excavation costs claimed are limited to what was necessary to reach the level of contamination acceptable for a residential use of the Property. In addition, the invoices provide few details. The Appellants have no way of knowing if the contractor potentially aggravated the situation when he hit the tank or removed it from the premises.

Référence : [2024] ABD 5