Le pouvoir discrétionnaire d'un juge en matière d'insolvabilité de permettre la compensation entre une dette pré et post dépôt ne peut être utilisé que dans des circonstances exceptionnelles

par Karim Renno
Renno Vathilakis Inc.

Nous avons déjà eu l'occasion de discuter de l'application des règles de la compensation en matière de faillite et de l'insolvabilité il y a presque 10 ans. Généralement, l'on dira que la compensation ne peut avoir lieu qu'entre deux dettes qui prédatent le dépôt des procédures d'insolvabilité (pre-filing) ou deux dettes qui naissent après le dépôt (post-filing). Cela étant dit, un juge saisi de telles procédures a le pouvoir discrétionnaire d'opérer compensation entre deux dettes qui ne respectent pas cette règle. Selon la Cour d'appel dans l'affaire Arrangement relatif à Bloom Lake (2022 QCCA 1740, demande pour permission d'en appeler à la Cour suprême refusée par 2023 CanLII 76805), ce pouvoir ne devrait être utilisé que dans des circonstances exceptionnelles.

Dans cette affaire, la Cour d'appel est saisie d'un appel à l'encontre d'un jugement de première instance rendu par l'Honorable juge Michel Pinsonnault accueillant une demande pour directives et déclarant que deux dettes ne peuvent être compensées dans le cadre de procédures déposées sous l'égide de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies.

Les appelantes plaident que le juge de première instance a erré en concluant que les dettes en jeu dans cette affaire n'étaient pas concomitantes, i.e. toutes deux nées avant la dette du dépôt.

L'Honorable juge Peter Kalichman, écrivant pour une formation unanime de la Cour, en vient à la conclusion que le juge de première instance a eu raison d'écarter la compensation en l'instance:

[37] Since the Damage payment ITCs are accessories to restructuring claims, the ARQ contends that they must therefore be pre-filing claims as well and can thus be set off against the ARQ Claims.

[38] I do not share this interpretation. Restructuring claims are post-filing claims that are deemed to be provable claims by virtue of s. 32(7) of the CCAA. They do not take on all the characteristics of a provable claim by mere virtue of the fact that they are treated as such for a particular purpose. More specifically, they are not transformed into pre-filing claims. If, as the ARQ suggests, restructuring claims were in all respects, provable claims within the meaning of s. 19 of the CCAA, s. 32(7) would be superfluous. It is rather because they would not otherwise be considered as provable claims that s. 32(7) of the CCAA has meaning.

[39] The ARQ also argues that according to civil law, the Damage Claims resulted from the application of liquidated damage clauses contained in the disclaimed contracts such that the damages and, by extension, the Damage payment ITCs, crystalized at the time the contracts were concluded. Since fiscal law is an accessory to civil law, the ARQ contends that the judge erred in failing to recognize that the Damage payment ITCs were thus pre-filing debts.

[40] The judge committed no such error. The wording of the Tax provisions is perfectly clear and it is not necessary to look elsewhere to understand what event triggers the duty to pay tax or the moment at which that duty arises.

Le juge Kalichman traite également de la possibilité pour un juge en matière d'insolvabilité d'utiliser son pouvoir discrétionnaire pour permettre la compensation. S'il reconnait l'existence d'un tel pouvoir, il souligne qu'il ne doit être exercé que dans des cirsconstances exceptionnelles:

[44] The Supreme Court’s decision in Montréal (City) v. Deloitte Restructuring Inc., which was rendered after the judgment under appeal, confirms that in exceptional circumstances, “a supervising judge has the discretion to authorize pre‑post compensation”. In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court clearly rejected the prohibition that was proposed in Kitco:

[57] A court’s discretion is therefore broad enough to allow it to stay the right of creditors to effect pre‑post compensation. In such a case, the prohibition against pre‑post compensation flows directly from the stay order. Conversely, a court may in its discretion refuse to impose such a prohibition or, if pre‑post compensation was stayed by the order, lift the stay at a later date to allow an interested creditor to assert its rights. On this point, we reject the absolute prohibition proposed by the Quebec Court of Appeal in Kitco, because we conclude that a court has the discretion to allow pre‑post compensation in appropriate cases.

[...]

[46] In exercising such discretion, a court must keep three baseline considerations in mind: “(1) the appropriateness of the order being sought, (2) due diligence and (3) good faith on the applicant’s part.”

[...]

[50] Even though the decision in Deloitte clears the path for a supervising judge to exercise discretion and allow for compensation between pre-filing and post-filing claims, the Supreme Court was perfectly clear that such discretion is only to be exercised in “exceptional circumstances, given the high disruptive potential of this form of compensation”. The judge committed no error much less a reviewable error in refusing to exercise such discretion in this case.

[51] Since the ARQ has failed to establish that the criterion of appropriateness is met, it is not necessary to consider good faith or due diligence.

Référence : [2023] ABD 2