Par Expert: il est inexact de dire qu'en l'absence d'une expertise ou d'une preuve précise du quantum des dommages, une réclamation doit être rejetée

par Karim Renno
Renno Vathilakis Inc.

Nous avons déjà traité de la question par le passé, mais la question est d'importance et beaucoup de parties défenderesses continuent d'erronément plaider ce point. S'il est vrai que la partie demanderesse dans une affaire a le fardeau de prouver l'existence d'un dommage, il en est autrement du quantum de ces dommages. Il est donc inexact pour une partie défenderesse de plaider qu'en l'absence d'une expertise ou d'une preuve précise sur le quantum des dommages, la réclamation doit être rejetée. La Cour d'appel vient de réitérer ce principe dans Dunkin' Brands Canada Ltd. c. Bertico inc. (2015 QCCA 624).

 

 

Dans cette affaire, l'Appelante fait valoir que le juge de première instance a eu tort d'accorder des dommages aux Intimés - ses ex-franchisés - des dommages pour perte de leur investissement.

 

L'Appelante fait valoir qu'en l'absence d'expertise déposée par l'Appelante ou de preuve précise quant au quantum des dommages subis, le juge de première instance aurait du rejeter ce poste de réclamation.

 

L'Honorable juge Nicholas Kasirer, au nom d'une formation unanime de la Cour, rejette cet argument. Il souligne qu'il est vrai de dire que les Intimés avaient le fardeau de prouver l'existence d'un préjudice, ce n'est pas le cas pour le quantum de celui-ci. En effet, une fois que le juge de première instance en vient à la conclusion qu'il existe un préjudice, alors il doit utiliser les éléments à sa disposition pour en arriver à un montant:

[202]     At the hearing, the panel asked counsel for the appellant how it proposed to remedy what it saw as the judge’s error in granting over $9 million for lost investments. The answer was unequivocal: the judge had used unreliable evidence based on a “flimsy and speculative method of evaluation”. The remedy was to strike this head of damages on appeal and award nothing for lost investments. 

[203]     The Franchisor is, to be sure, wrong on this point. 

[204]     While the Franchisees most certainly had the burden of proving their lost investments, the judge was of the view that they had acquitted that task. The burden falls to the Franchisor to show an error that warrants intervention on appeal. 

[205]     The argument at trial and on appeal turned not on the existence of damage, but on the quantum of the lost investments. Once the lost profits were granted for the period preceding 2005, the Franchisees were left with assets – their businesses – that were diminished in value because of the Franchisor’s fault. Even the Franchisor’s expert Harrar, while contesting the amount of the loss, did not deny its existence. The problem at trial was not whether lost investment existed, but what was its proper quantum. 

[206]     The judge had a duty to use the evidence adduced to fix the amount of the loss.   

[207]     This Court has been resolute in distinguishing between the proof of the existence of damage, on the one hand, and proof of the quantum of damage for which the existence has been established, on the other. Where fault is proven and the trier of fact ascertains that there is proof that some damage flows from the debtor’s fault, it is the duty of the presiding judge to evaluate the damage as best as he or she can based on admissible evidence. The comments of Hugessen A.C.J., then of the Superior Court, in Raymor have been understood to be instructive in this regard: 

Notwithstanding that Plaintiff’s tender was very substantially lower than the next lowest and successful tenderer, I find that there is some evidentiary basis for this part of the claim, so as to lift it out of the realm of “mere speculation” and permit me to assess damages with “a reasonable degree of certainty”.  

Even where the assessment of damages in a contractual matter is extremely difficult, it is the duty of the Court, once it is tolerably clear that there have been some damages suffered, to attempt to estimate them in much the same manner as a jury would be called upon to do.  

As stated by the Court of Appeal, in Rothpan v. Drouin ([1959] B.R. 626):  

Lorsque le Tribunal constate qu'une partie a subi un préjudice dont l'autre doit réparation. Il n'est pas nécessaire, pour qu'elle en détermine l'étendue, qu'une preuve positive ait été rapportée sur le chiffre de cette perte. Il suffit qu'il se trouve au dossier des éléments lui permettant de l'apprécier.   

[…]  

I cannot overlook the fact that even this amount is theoretical and depends upon a number of contingencies as to which the proof is not entirely satisfactory. I would therefore reduce it by a further 25% to cover such contingencies and unforeseen or overlooked matters and, rounding out the figure thus obtained, would fix Plaintiffs damages in the amount of $5,000.  

[footnotes omitted] 

[208]     The cases the Franchisor cites on appeal in service of its argument that no damages should be awarded are mostly instances in which a plaintiff, at trial, failed to prove the existence of its damage. That is not the case here. There are some cases in which judges explain that a claim for damages should be dismissed in the absence of reliable expert evidence. In our case, however, unlike others, the judge’s view of the evidence was that certain damages had been shown on the basis of evidence given by an ordinary witness. That finding is not in itself a reviewable error. 

[209]     In appeals in which this Court is faced with evidence of the existence of a loss that was accepted by a trial judge, as in the present case, it has been decided that the burden of showing the quantum was wrongly fixed falls to the appellant. In Société du Parc des îles v. Renaud, for example, my colleague Morissette, J.A. recognized that a trial judge is entitled to fix damages as best he or she can, even if evidence of quantum is seriously contested: 

[26] Ce faisant, le juge arbitrait les dommages et intérêts comme il se devait de le faire dans les circonstances. Ayant conclu à l’existence de divers manquements à leurs obligations de la part des appelantes, manquements qui selon toute probabilité avaient été dommageables pour l’achalandage de l’entreprise exploitée par l’intimée, il lui fallait rechercher dans la preuve la démonstration probable du montant du préjudice financier subi par l’intimée. C’est ce qu’il a fait, conformément au principe énoncé dans l’arrêt Rothpan c. Drouin, [1959] B.R. 626, principe que le juge en chef adjoint Hugessen de la Cour supérieure avait formulé en ces termes dans la décision Raymor Painting Contractors (Canada) Ltd c. Purolator Courier Ltd, [1976] C.S. 468, à la page  472 : 

Even where the assessment of damages in a contractual matter is extremely difficult, it is the duty of the court, once it is tolerably clear that there have been some damages suffered, to attempt to estimate them in much the same manner as a jury would be called upon to do.

(Voir aussi Crealise Packaging Inc./Créalise Conditionnement inc. c. A.S.M. Canada Ltd, J.E. 97-1383 (C.S.)).

[210]     The assessment of lost profits was indeed “extremely difficult” but, to invoke the idea of Hugessen, A.C.J. taken up by the Court in Société du Parc des îles, it was tolerably clear that the Franchisees had suffered lost investments and, accordingly, it was the duty of the trial judge to settle on an amount. 

[211]     In so doing, did the judge commit a palpable and overriding error? 

[212]     Again the burden falls to the Franchisor as appellant.

Commentaire:

 

La morale ici est qu'il est une très mauvaise idée pour une partie défenderesse de ne pas retenir les services d'un expert au seul motif que la partie demanderesse n'en a pas. Puisque la partie défenderesse ne peut pas plaider que l'établissement du quantum exact est le fardeau de la partie demanderesse, il est hautement préférable pour la défenderesse de faire sa propre preuve sur le quantum. À défaut, elle sera à la merci de l'approximation faite par le juge.

 

Référence : [2015] ABD Expert 16