Lorsqu'il existe un débat quant à la juridiction d'un arbitre conventionnel, la Cour supérieure devrait ordonner la suspension du recours judiciaire pour donner l'opportunité à l'arbitre de se prononcer sur sa compétence

par Karim Renno
Renno Vathilakis Inc.

Nous avons déjà traité du fait que, règle générale, c'est à l'arbitre de trancher d'abord la question de sa compétence pour se saisir d'un litige. Ainsi, lorsqu'un recours judiciaire est déposé et qu'une demande de renvoi à l'arbitrage est formulée, à moins d'exception, la Cour devrait suspendre (et non rejeter) le recours judiciaire et donner à l'arbitre l'opportunité de trancher la question de sa propre compétence. C'est ce que nous enseigne la Cour d'appel dans Cannatechnologie inc. c. Matica Enterprises inc. (2022 QCCA 758).

Dans cette affaire, la Cour est saisie d'un pourvoi à l'encontre d'un jugement de première instance qui a accueilli une exception déclinatoire, rejetée le recours intenté et renvoyé les parties à l'arbitrage.

L'Appelante fait valoir que cette exception déclinatoire était manifestement mal fondée puisqu'elle n'est pas signataire du contrat qui contient la clause compromissoire. 

Une formation unanime de la Cour composée des Honorables juges Bélanger, Rancourt et Moore intervient pour modifier les conclusions du jugement de première instance, mais elle confirme pour l'essentiel le jugement de première instance. En effet, la Cour indique que le juge de première instance a eu raison de déférer à l'arbitre la question de sa propre compétence, cependant il n'aurait pas dû rejeter le recours mais plutôt le suspendre en attendant la décision de l'arbitre:

[9] In the particular circumstances of the case at bar, the judge should not have dismissed the appellant’s originating application; rather, he should have stayed it so that the arbitrator could rule on the issue of his or her own jurisdiction by applying the “competence-competence” principle developed in well-established jurisprudence. The judge, however, cannot be faulted for not having done so, given that neither party raised this principle. 

[10] It is worth noting that, pursuant to this principle, arbitrators have the competence to rule on their own jurisdiction over a given dispute and, furthermore, courts cannot rule on the issue of jurisdiction until the arbitrator, himself or herself, has done so. In this context, when proceedings are instituted before the Superior Court and a declinatory exception is raised seeking to have the matter referred to arbitration, the court must, pursuant to art. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“C.C.P.”), limit itself to a prima facie assessment of whether or not the dispute comes under the arbitration agreement. If it determines that the arbitration agreement prima facie applies, it must refer the matter to arbitration so that the arbitrator can rule on the issue in accordance with the procedure he or she sees fit. Only once the arbitrator has exercised jurisdiction can the aggrieved party challenge the decision in court pursuant to art. 632 C.C.P. 

[11] The appellant argues that it was not appropriate to refer to the “competence-competence” principle because, in the present matter, the application of the arbitration clause gave rise to a question of law or, at best, a question of fact requiring only a superficial consideration of the documentary evidence in the record. 

[12] We cannot accept this argument. On the contrary, the record indicates that numerous questions of fact must be decided in order to understand the effect of the arbitration clause on the present dispute. For one thing, Cannatechnologie is not one of the signatories to the Investment Agreement, notwithstanding the allegation that, at that time, it already held shares of Royalmax through 9076484. Likewise, the respondents dispute the scope of the collateral agreement which the trial judge referred to and which pertains to the claim asserted by Cannatechnologie. Finally, as another example, the link between Matica’s increased shareholding and the Investment Agreement is also ambiguous or uncertain. 

[13] These questions require more than a superficial analysis of the documentary evidence. They can only be adjudicated after sufficient evidence has been adduced so as to allow a decision-maker to determine whether or not the arbitration clause should apply. It is the arbitrator who must perform that analysis. At this stage, it was therefore sufficient for the judge to note, as is indeed the case, that, prima facie, the record contained sufficient elements to support the application of the arbitration clause.

 Référence : [2022] ABD 216