Les circonstances dans lesquelles la Cour d'appel acceptera d'intervenir en matière de quantification des dommages

par Karim Renno
Renno Vathilakis Inc.

L'évaluation par un juge de première instance du quantum des dommages subis par une partie est un exercice essentiellement factuel (et parfois mixte). Il n'est donc pas surprenant que la Cour d'appel n'accepte que rarement d'intervenir dans la quantification des dommages. La Cour discute des circonstances où elle acceptera d'intervenir dans l'affaire A & S Tuckpointing Enterprise Inc. c. Szalavetz (2015 QCCA 961).

 

Dans cette affaire, l'Appelante se pourvoit à l'encontre d'un jugement de première instance qui l'a condamné à payer des dommages au montant de 105 462,97$ aux Intimés et a radié son hypothèque légale de la construction.

 

L'Appelante présente plusieurs arguments en appel, incluant des arguments relatifs à la quantification des dommages.

 

Une formation unanime composée des Honorables juges Thibault, Vauclair et Schrager rejette l'appel. Sur la question des dommages, la Cour rappelle qu'elle n'interviendra que dans des circonstances exceptionnelles où il est démontré à la Cour que le juge de première instance a commis une erreur manifeste:

[12]        As for the balcony railings, approximately half (numbering 86) were damaged by Appellant necessitating their replacement. However, in order to conserve the appearance of the building, Respondents replaced all the railings. Nevertheless, Respondents only claimed compensation for the 86 railings damaged by Appellant. Though the railings were approximately 6 years old, the judge did not include a factor for depreciation since, in his assessment of the quantum, Appellant’s fault had in effect necessitated the replacement of the undamaged railings as well. This, in the judge’s view, cancelled out any consideration for depreciation on the cost of replacement of the damaged railings. 

[13]        Quantification of damages is an exercise which requires deference; a court of appeal should not intervene unless the trial judge has committed an error of law or the compensation awarded is manifestly incorrect. The application of a factor for depreciation to the calculation of damages is an exercise of judicial discretion and is not a science. 

[14]        In applying these principles, we discern no error that could warrant appellate intervention into the exercise of discretion by the judge not to include any consideration for depreciation of the 3 year-old roof. Our comment is likewise regarding the judge’s reasoning not to include any depreciation in the award for the damaged balcony railings. His thought process was rational, logical and reasonable and based on evidence in the record.

Référence : [2015] ABD 223