Intervention en vertu de l'article 211 C.p.c.: le fait de clairement appuyer la position d'une partie milite contre l'autorisation d'intervenir

par Karim Renno
Irving Mitchell Kalichman s.e.n.c.r.l.

L'article 211 C.p.c. donne aux tribunaux québécois un large pouvoir discrétionnaire pour permettre à un tiers de pouvoir faire des représentations dans une affaire donnée. L'exercice de ce pouvoir discrétionnaire peut prendre appui sur une variété de considérations concrêtes. Dans Dunkin' Brands Canada Ltd. c. Bertico inc. (2013 QCCA 867), l'Honorable juge Clément Gascon était saisi d'une telle demande et l'a rejetée en partie en raison du fait que la contribution de la Requérante allait essentiellement se résumer à supporter la position de l'Appelante.

 

Nous avons traité du jugement de première instance dans cette affaire le 28 juin 2012. Essentiellement, il s'agit d'un litige en matière de franchisage où le juge de première instance en est venu à la conclusion que l'Appelante, la franchiseure, n'a pas rempli ses obligations explicites et implicites envers les Intimées.

 

La Requérante, en vertu de l'article 211 C.p.c., demande la permission d'intervenir au stade de l'appel pour faire des représentations sur certaines questions relatives au franchisage.

 

Le juge Gascon, après avoir souligné la nature essentiellement discrétionnaire du pouvoir de la Cour de permettre l'intervention d'une partie, en vient à la conclusion que la demande de l'Intervenante doit être rejetée. Cette décision est motivée en partie par le fait qu'il appert clairement que l'Intervenante viendrait clairement supporter la position de l'Appelante et non présenter un point de vue neutre ou différent de l'Appelante:

[18]        That said, in determining whether an intervention is expedient or not, a judge enjoys a wide discretion. The exercise of this discretion calls for an assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of allowing the intervention. One of the key elements is to evaluate whether or not the intervening party can efficiently assist the court. A petitioner must thus convince the judge that it will indeed offer an additional and useful perspective on the issues at stake that is different from what the parties will likely submit themselves. 

[19]        Any impact upon the process, in this case the appeal process, or upon the different positions of the parties directly involved is a factor to be considered as well. 

[20]        In private disputes more particularly, the position of the parties involved on the intervention request must be taken into account. The principles of proportionality and of proper balance between the relative strength of the principal parties come into play. As previously stated by the Court, albeit in a very different context,  "[t]he preservation of the fairness of the appellate process is critical to the exercise of the Court's discretion in deciding whether or not to grant intervener status to an applicant". 

[21]        In this case, it is not disputed that the CFA is a not-for-profit national trade association committed to the growth, enhancement and development of franchising in Canada. Its credibility and good faith are not at issue in this intervention process.  

[22]        Still, I cannot agree with its statement that it will not take sides in this appeal and that it is not interested in which party wins the case. The CFA's intervention is aimed at contesting the existence of the implied obligations recognized by the trial judge and which form, at least in part, the basis of the conclusions he reached in favour of the Respondents.  

[23]        The allegations of the Motion for leave to intervene indicate rather clearly that the CFA's position will be supportive of Appellant and will be focussed upon setting aside, at least in part, the trial judgment. There is no indication that any of its arguments will indeed favour the Respondents' position, to the contrary. It is indeed worth mentioning that while Appellant is a member of the CFA, this is not the case of the Respondents. 

[24]        This is, in my view, an important element to consider when assessing whether or not to grant an intervening party status in the context of what is, in the end, a private dispute. From this standpoint, I consider that the Respondents are right in stating that allowing the CFA's intervention will force them to devote additional time and expense to face another opponent, and that this will ultimately create an imbalance between the parties on "the two sides of the dispute", to their detriment.  

[25]        In addition, I am not convinced that the arguments to be presented by the CFA will be different from those of the Appellant in support of its request for the reversal of the trial judgment. For instance, when one compares the grounds put forward by the CFA at paragraph 18 of its Motion to the following paragraphs included in Appellant's inscription in appeal, the similarity is striking:

 

Le texte intégral du jugement est disponible ici: http://bit.ly/16JJLMO

Référence neutre: [2013] ABD 200