La norme de contrôle pour un jugement rendu par un tribunal administratif sur une question constitutionnelle dependra de la nature de la décision

par Karim Renno
Irving Mitchell Kalichman s.e.n.c.r.l.

Qui dit révision judiciaire dit d'abord et avant tout détermination de la norme de contrôle appropriée. Si jadis tout ce qui touchait a la sphère constitutionnelle était régie par la norme de la décision correcte, la situation n'est plus si simple depuis la décision rendue par la Cour suprême du Canada dans l'affaire Doré c. Barreau du Québec ([2012] 1 R.C.S. 395). Comme le souligne l'Honorable juge Thomas M. Davis dans L'Ecuyer c. Cote (2013 QCCS 973), la décision d'un tribunal administratif qui se prononce sur la constitutionnalité d'une disposition législative est régie par la norme de la décision correcte, mais celle qui ne fait qu'appliquer les principes constitutionnels mérite, elle, déférence.

Dans cette affaire, les Demandeurs recherchent la révision judiciaire d'une décision de la Commission des normes du travail qui a déclare inconstitutionnel le paragraphe 5 de l'article 21 du Code du travail parce que contraire a l'article 2d de la Charte canadienne et l'article 3 de la Charte québécoise.

 

Dans le cadre de son analyse, le juge Davis doit d'abord déterminer quelle est la norme de contrôle applicable. A ce chapitre, il souligne que c'est la norme de la décision correcte qui trouve application puisque la Commission a déclaré une disposition législative inconstitutionnelle. Par ailleurs, il note que la norme n'aurait pas été la meme s'il avait été simplement allégué que la décision attaquée ne respectait pas les principes constitutionnels applicables:

[75] The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in the matter of Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick sets out the criteria which a reviewing court must consider in determining the appropriate standard of review. In the present matter, the Commission was required to consider the constitutionality of a specific provision of the Code. Dunsmuir makes it clear that such a decision must be correct:

[58] For example, correctness review has been found to apply to constitutional questions regarding the division of powers between Parliament and the provinces in the Constitution Act, 1867: Westcoast Energy Inc. v. Canada (National Energy Board), 1998 CanLII 813 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 322 . Such questions, as well as other constitutional issues, are necessarily subject to correctness review because of the unique role of s. 96 courts as interpreters of the Constitution: Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin, 2003 SCC 54 (CanLII), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 , 2003 SCC 54; Mullan, Administrative Law, at p. 60.

[76] The Doré decision, referred to by the Union, deals with a different scenario. Maitre Doré did not contest the constitutionality of a legislative provision. Rather, he argued that the decision of the disciplinary committee seized with a complaint against him was unconstitutional in and of itself, as being a limitation on his freedom of speech. As the Supreme Court of Canada states, the analysis of this kind of question is different from the analysis required when the constitutionality of the legislative provision is under attack:

[36] As explained by Chief Justice McLachlin in Alberta v. Hutterian Brethrenof Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37 (CanLII), 2009 SCC 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 , the approach used when reviewing the constitutionality of a law should be distinguished from the approach used for reviewing an administrative decision that is said to violate the rights of a particular individual (see also Bernatchez). When Charter values are applied to an individual administrative decision, they are being applied in relation to a particular set of facts. Dunsmuir tells us this should attract deference (para. 53; see also Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1 (CanLII), 2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 , at para. 39). When a particular “law” is being assessed for Charter compliance, on the other hand, we are dealing with principles of general application.

[77] It cannot be successfully argued, that the decision of the Commission is an individual administrative decision where the Commission was called upon to apply the Charter values to a particular set of facts. Rather, it is a decision which assesses whether or not paragraph 5 of section 21 complies with the Charter and whether it impinges on freedom of association. 

[78] This does not mean that when the Court looks at the factual conclusions of the Commission it should be insensitive to the fact that the Commission had the benefit of hearing witnesses during a lengthy hearing. However, the Court must still be convinced that the Commission rendered the correct decision, failing which the decision should be revised.

Le texte intégral du jugement est disponible ici: http://bit.ly/12PDYnO

Référence neutre: [2013] ABD 103