Irving Mitchell Kalichman s.e.n.c.r.l.
Vous pensiez prendre congé de nos billets pendant le temps des fêtes? Aucune chance. Nous sommes toujours au poste pour discuter avec vous de la jurisprudence récente. Au menu ce matin, la décision récente de l'Honorable juge Gary D.D. Morrison dans Hewlett-Packard France c. Matrox Graphics Inc. (2012 QCCS 6261) où il est question de l'autorité de la chose jugée.
Je vous épargne la trame factuelle de cette affaire qui est, somme toute, assez complexe. Le jugement dont nous traitons suit une décision de la Cour par laquelle la cause a été scindée. La décision du juge Morrison traite de certaines questions de principe à être décidées au stade initial. Un de ces questions a trait à l'autorité de la chose jugée.
En octobre 2011, nous traitions du fait que l'autorité de la chose jugée n'était pas diminuée, de quelque façon que ce soit, par le fait que le jugement rendu n'était plus du bon droit (voir notre billet ici: http://bit.ly/WBtdOM). Or, appliquant le même principe, le juge Morrison indique que la question du bien fondé de la décision initiale sur laquelle se base une partie pour invoquer la chose jugée n'est d'aucune pertinence:
[22] An absolute legal presumption is born of the authority of a final judgment - res judicata. It cannot be rebutted. This absolute presumption is established in Article 2848 C.C.Q.
[23] The purpose of the presumption has been the subject of doctrine and jurisprudence over decades. Suffice if to say that it is intended to serve both a public and private interest, including avoiding a multiplicity of trials and the possibility of contradictory judgments It is essentially a matter of the efficient and orderly use of the judicial system in such a manner as to provide reliability and certainty to the parties. As will be seen later, this purpose is relevant to this particular case.
[24] Moreover, the presumption of res judicatais so important under Quebec civil law that it will apply even to a final judgment that contains an error.
[25] This latter principle is of some relevance to the present matter. MGI contends that the Appeal Decision was based in part on a Record containing an incorrect fact, such that the proof before the Court of Appeal was wrong.
[26] MGI refers to an enlarged copy of Clause 12(a) of the ST's Ts & C's which was filed before the Superior Court and formed part of the Record before the Court of Appeal. MGI argues that the actual wording of Clause 12(a) differs. It qualifies this as an "earthquake", since the difference favours ST. It argues that it is enough to prevent ST from benefiting from res judicata. But MGI has not demonstrated that it did not know or could not have known of these differences at the time. MGI's contention that it has relied on ST, in good faith, is not a justification for saying it was unaware of the word differences in Clause 12(a). Not having responded to ST's Notice to Admit, MGI is even deemed to have admitted D-4; in any event, its attention was drawn to the exhibit and it did not raise the wording differences at that time. Nor has MGI demonstrated, or even argued, that it attempted to either have a new hearing or have the Appeal Decision corrected. That being said, such errors, as in this case, are not of such nature or impact to justify refusing the presumption of res judicata, should it otherwise apply. The Court has no reason whatsoever to consider the wording differences to have negatively impacted on the judgments rendered to date in these files – those judgements have not somehow been tainted by the different wording.
Référence neutre: [2012] ABD 469
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