Les conclusions factuelles du juge de première instance à l'égard de l'abus de procédure méritent déférence en appel

par Karim Renno
Renno Vathilakis Inc.

La Cour d'appel nous enseigne souvent que l'appel n'est pas un forum pour refaire le procès de première instance. Cela est particulièrement vrai en matière d'abus de procédure comme le rappelle l'Honorable juge Nicholas Kasirer dans la décision récente rendue dans l'affaire Pileggi c. Paliotti (2018 QCCA 2172). En effet, les conclusions factuelles d'abus du juge de première instance méritent déférence.

Dans cette affaire, le juge Kasirer est saisi de la demande de permission d'en appeler d'un jugement de première instance qui a rejeté un recours en diffamation. Ce jugement a également conclu à l'abus de procédure.

Le juge Kasirer note d'emblée que le Requérant tente de refaire le procès de première instance. Rappelant que ce n'est pas le rôle de la Cour d'appel, le juge Kasirer souligne que les conclusions d'abus méritent déférence:

[13] As to the finding of abuse, here too the petitioner contests the judge’s evaluation of the facts leading to his conclusion that the petitioner’s action was “an inappropriately aggressive use of court procedure”. The judge noted that, after weighing the evidence, that the action had no foundation in the absence of any proof of damage and with questionable evidence of fault. Deference is owed to the judge in respect of this factual aspect of a finding of abuse of proceedings: Centre commercial Innovation inc. v. Institut de dermopigmentation, 2011 QCCA 1954 (CanLII), para. [2]. By his various arguments, the petitioner seeks to retry this matter which, needless to say, is not the function of the Court. The sum of his arguments is a far cry from constituting a question meriting the attention of the Court.  

[14] It is of no moment that, prior to the judge’s full review of the facts, motions to dismiss the action brought by the defendants had been dismissed. In response to these proceedings, the petitioner was given the benefit of the doubt. This does not change the fact that when all the evidence was in, the judge was entitled to conclude that the action amounted to an abuse of proceedings. 

[15] The judge plainly understood the petitioner’s conduct before the courts as amounting to a civil wrong that caused harm, in particular as an exercise designed to put the defendants and the Spiritual Center under personal and financial strain. While the judge does not use these specific terms found in article 51 C.C.P., one understands he is of the view that the petitioner’s conduct before the court was “excessive” and “unreasonable”, and amounts to an “attempt to defeat the ends of justice” by using the defamation suit to achieve another purpose – in short, a civil fault that gives rise to a claim for compensation.

Référence : [2019] ABD 4