La Cour supérieure rappelle qu'une injonction interlocutoire en matière de diffamation ne peut que viser des propos précis

par Karim Renno
Irving Mitchell Kalichman s.e.n.c.r.l.

Mes lecteurs assidus savent qu'une de mes causes préférées est la protection de la liberté d'expression, particulièrement dans le contexte d'une injonction. C'est pourquoi j'attire cet après-midi votre attention sur un jugement récent de l'Honorable juge David R. Collier, Forensic Technologies Inc. c. Pyramidal Technologies Inc. (2012 QCCS 2463), où il fait une revue admirable des principles applicables au stade interlocutoire.

Dans cette affaire, la Demanderesse recherche l'émission d'une injonction interlocutoire pour prohiber les Défendeurs de prononcer des propos faux et diffamatoires à propos des produits et services de la Demanderesse et protéger sa propriété intellectuelle.

Le juge Collier rappelle d'abord les principes applicables à une demande d'injonction interlocutoire où l'on cherche à limiter la liberté d'expression d'une autre partie:

[7] An injunction is an extraordinary remedy. In matters involving freedom of expression, the court must exercise great caution in issuing injunctions that restrain parties from expressing their opinions - the court must limit the remedy to those rare cases where the defamatory character of the statement is clear and unjustified. In Champagne c. Collège d'enseignement général et professionnel de Jonquière, the Court of Appeal held that:

The common law authorities in Canada and the United Kingdom have suggested the guiding principle that interlocutory injunctions should only be granted to restrain in advance written or spoken words in the rarest and clearest of cases – where the words are so manifestly defamatory and impossible to justify that an action in defamation would almost certainly succeed. Given the value we place on freedom of expression, particularly in matters of public interest, that guiding principle has much to recommend it.

[8] This principle applies in the present case, which involves commercial speech. Freedom of expression includes expression in the commercial sphere. 

[9] An interlocutory injunction should only issue where the evidence shows that the author of the allegedly defamatory remarks intends to repeat them.  Moreover, an interlocutory order must be restricted to specific statements or comments and cannot apply generally to all statements of a defamatory character, since such an imprecise order would constitute an undue restriction on freedom of expression. 

[10] An interlocutory order is imprecise and invalid if it seeks to restrain acts of unfair competition, without specifying the defendant's specific acts that constitute the unfair competition.

Il indique ensuite que seuls les propos spécifiques peuvent être prohibés au stade interlocutoire, dans la mesure où les Défendeurs n'offrent pas de justification possible pour ceux-ci. En l'instance, le juge Collier en vient à la conclusion que, prima facie, les Défendeurs offrent des justifications plausibles pour la plupart des propos tenus, de sorte qu'une injonction interlocutoire n'est pas appropriée pour ceux-ci.

Pour les autres, même sans justification, le juge Collier refuse d'émettre une injonction, la Demanderesse n'ayant pas démontré de préjudice. Implicite dans son raisonnement est le fait que l'on ne saurait présumer que toute déclaration fausse ou même diffamatoire cause automatiquement un préjudice:

[21] Thirdly, the plaintiff takes issue with the inference on Pyramidal's website that Forensic Technology treats its customers with a monopolistic attitude. The plaintiff alleges that a document on the website states that Pyramidal's customers deserve to "be treated fairly and never feel abused or ripped off by a company with a monopolistic attitude". On cross-examination, Barrett admitted that although Forensic Technology is not named in the statement, readers would probably understand it as referring to the plaintiff, since it controls 90% of the North American market. 

[22] The defendants have not justified Pyramidal's statement, which some readers could understand as a thinly veiled attack on the plaintiff. In the absence of other considerations, the plaintiff appears to have a right to an order requiring that the statement be removed from Pyramidal's website. 

[23] However, it is not possible to conclude that such an order is necessary to prevent a serious and irreparable harm to the plaintiff. No evidence was made at the hearing that the offending statement continues to appears on the defendant's website. In fact, the absence of contemporary evidence is an overriding difficulty with the plaintiff's motion, which asks the Court to restrain the defendants' behaviour more than two years after it is alleged to have occurred.

Le texte intégral du jugement est disponible ici: http://bit.ly/KvWX9I

Référence neutre: [2012] ABD 190