La Cour supérieure émet des doutes quant à l'application de la défense de provocation en droit pénal professionnel

par Karim Renno
Irving Mitchell Kalichman s.e.n.c.r.l.

L'application de la défense de provocation (en anglais "entrapment") hors du cadre du droit criminel est un sujet controversé en droit canadien et québécois. C'est pourquoi nous avons lu avec grand intérêt la décision récente de la Cour supérieure dans Lussier c. Ordre des opticiens d'ordonnance du Québec (2011 QCCS 6774) qui traite du sujet.


Dans cette affaire, l'Appelante se pourvoi devant la Cour supérieure à l'encontre d'une décision rendue le 25 février 2011 par la Cour du Québec, dans laquelle elle a été trouvée coupable de l'infraction suivante:

"À Boucherville, le ou vers le 2 octobre 2008, a exercé illégalement la profession d’opticien d’ordonnances en procédant à l’ajustement de lentilles ophtalmiques pour le bénéfice de Sylvain Paquet en effectuant des ajustements aux dites lentilles lors de leur livraison, alors qu’elle n’était pas titulaire d’un permis valide et approprié et qu’elle n’était pas inscrite au tableau de l’Ordre des opticiens d’ordonnances du Québec, contrevenant ainsi à l’article 32 du Code des professions (L.R.Q. c. C-26) ainsi qu’aux articles 8 et 15 de la Loi sur les opticiens d’ordonnances (L.R.Q., c. O-6), se rendant ainsi passible d’une amende prévue à l’article 188 du Code des professions (L.R.Q. c. C-26). "

L'Appelante avait, entre autres moyens de défense, demandé l'arrêt des procédures devant la Cour du Québec au motif que l'Intimée avait commis un abus de procédure. Dans les faits, cet abus était allégué avoir été de la provocation de la part d'un agent de l'Intimée. En effet, celui-ci, dans le cadre de l'enquête qui a mené à l'émission du constat d'infraction, c'était présenté comme un client. L'Appelante fait valoir que des motifs purement politiques sous-tendaient cette enquête et qu'elle n'était donc pas justifiée.

L'Honorable juge J. Fraser Martin ne voit pas les choses du même oeil. En plus d'émettre des doutes quant à l'applicabilité de la défense de provocation en droit pénal professionnel, il souligne que, de toute façon, le comportement de l'Intimée ici ne rencontrait pas les critères de la provocation:

[61] First of all the Appellant is not a member of either Order and it makes little sense, in seeking to control the practice of the profession, that employees should be previously individually identified as being culpable or potentially culpable before any investigation can be undertaken. The investigation was in fact carried out in relation to the Boucherville branch itself. Why then not institute proceedings against the proprietors or franchisees of the branch the Appellant may ask? A fair question. That option may have been open to the Respondents but the fact that it was not exercised changes nothing.  

[62] Secondly and more importantly even if one takes the words of the Court of Appeal at their face value the contention of counsel for the Appellant that she must either have previously contravened the statute or that there must exist reasonable grounds to suspect such a contravention this would be of no assistance to her. This argument, standing alone cannot trigger the issue of entrapment.   

[63] Entrapment, as I have been at pains to underline requires some sort of shocking conduct on the part of the state or of its agents. With respect random virtue testing is only one element of such conduct.  

[64] It may well be that the words of the Court of Appeal underscore the fact that the statute places a limitation on the scope of an investigation by the Order. If that is so then the remedy is to simply move for dismissal of the charges given that a statutory imperative relating to the investigation has not been respected. In my respectful view it is however exorbitant to pretend that in such circumstances a stay of proceedings on the basis of entrapment could lie.  

[65] In any event all of this simply begs the question. We are not dealing with criminal matters here and the state and its agents are not involved in the investigation. The investigation under consideration here was undertaken at the instance of the Order of Dispensing Opticians alone.   

[66] It is interesting to note in Clothier (supra) that Laskin J.A. at paragraph 28 states the following;

"[28] The two main appeal decisions are R. v. Donkersgoed, 2007 ONCJ 467, which was relied on by Taylor J.P. in the present case, and R. v. Cho, [2000] O.J. No. 5354 (C.J.). In both cases the court held that random test shopping does not amount to entrapment. In other words, the authorities may engage in test shopping without a reasonable suspicion that either a particular store or stores in the area are selling tobacco to underage persons. In Cho Finlayson J.A. denied leave to appeal, and in so doing baldly stated “the defence of entrapment is not available in regulatory offences”: see [2001] O.J. No. 1041 (C.A.). His conclusion is instructive, but, of course, a decision of a judge of this court denying leave to appeal has no precedential value."

[67] This, I would suggest, is why Laskin J.A. was careful to limit his comments to the issue of the application of the Smoke Free Ontario Act. As he pointed out the question of whether the issue of entrapment is available in other circumstances or for an offence under another regulatory statute should be determined when that issue arises.  

[68] This is not a state prosecution. It is a prosecution by a provincially constituted professional Order. While it may be possible to imagine circumstances where entrapment, if established, may be invoked in support of a stay of proceedings in a prosecution for a provincial regulatory offence that is certainly not the case here.   

[69] In this context, I take comfort in Justice Ewaschuk’s observation in Criminal Pleadings and Practice in Canada (supra) at number 21:8000 where, particularly having regard for the Clothier decision, he puts it as follows:

The doctrine of entrapment does not apply to “provincial regulatory offences”. Nonetheless government is not allowed to investigate possible illegal activity in a way that offends the Canadian sense of decency and fair play.

[70] It follows from the foregoing that the first judge did not err in concluding that the notion of entrapment had not been established in the case at bar. I would go further. The notion of entrapment simply does not apply.

Le texte intégral du jugement est disponible ici: http://bit.ly/v1VRZW

Référence neutre: [2011] ABD 412