La LPC ne permet pas l'attribution de dommages punitifs en l'absence d'un contrat de consommation

par Karim Renno
Irving Mitchell Kalichman s.e.n.c.r.l.

En matière de droit de la consommation, la possibilité pour le consommateur d'obtenir des dommages punitifs a beaucoup de poids. En effet, cette mesure est potentiellement très onéreuse pour les commercants. Ceci étant dit, comme l'indique l'Honorable juge William Fraiberg dans Leblanc c. United Parcel Service du Canada Ltée. (2012 QCCS 4619), il ne peut y avoir attribution de dommages punitifs en l'absence d'un contrat de consommation entre les parties.

Dans cette affaire, les Requérants sont des résidents québécois qui ont fait l'acquisition des biens qui leur ont été livrés par des compagnies de messagerie. Invoquant des articles du Code civil du Québec et de la Loi sur la protection du consommateur, les Requérants demandent l'autorisation d'instituer un recours collectifs contre lesdites compagnies pour récupérer le montant que leur ont facturé les Intimées pour la livraison de ces biens, en plus d'un montant de 20$ par membre à titre de dommages punitifs.

 

Le juge Fraiberg est saisi de la demande d'autorisation. Traitant spécifiquement de la question des dommages punitifs, il est d'avis qu'il ne peut autoriser cette conclusion. En effet, les membres du groupe n'ont pas contracté avec les Intimées. Puisque l'article 272 L.p.c. ne ne permet l'attribution de dommages punitifs que lorsqu'il existe un contrat de consommation entre les parties, cette réclamation ne peut tenir:

[196] In the recent case of Richard v. Time Inc., the Supreme Court ruled (per LeBel and Cromwell, JJ) that the CPA does not permit a Quebec consumer to seek punitive damages in the absence of a contract between the consumer and a merchant:

[102] The C.P.A. does not expressly define the consumer as a natural person who has entered into a contract governed by the Act. According to s. 1 (e) C.P.A., a consumer is “a natural person, except a merchant who obtains goods or services for the purposes of his business”. At first glance, therefore, it might be thought that the “consumer” referred to in s. 272 C.P.A.need not have a contractual relationship with a merchant or a manufacturer to be found to have the legal interest required to institute proceedings under that provision. This view appears to be reinforced by s. 217 C.P.A., which provides that “[t]he fact that a prohibited practice has been used is not subordinate to whether or not a contract has been made”. This is the gist of the position taken by the appellant on this question (transcript, at pp. 26-27). 

[104] However, even a large and liberal principle of interpretation cannot justify overlooking the rules that are laid down in the Act to govern its application. One of those rules is found in s. 2 of the Act, which determines the general scope of the C.P.A., providing that “[t]his Act applies to every contract for goods or services entered into between a consumer and a merchant in the course of his business”. Section 2 C.P.A. establishes the basic principle that a consumer contract must exist for the Act to apply, except in the specific case of the Act’s penal provisions. Professor Masse explains this as follows:

[translation] Generally speaking, five conditions must be met for the C.P.A. to apply: 

1– A contract must be entered into by the parties; 

2– One of the parties to the contract must be a “consumer”; 

3– One of the parties must be a “merchant”; 

4– The “merchant” must be acting in the course of his or her business; and 

5– The contract must be for goods or services.

[105] If ss. 1 (e) and 2 C.P.A. are read together, it must be concluded that the recourse under s. 272 C.P.A. is available only to natural persons who have entered into a contract governed by the Act with a merchant or a manufacturer. A natural person who has not entered into such a consumer contract cannot be considered a “consumer” within the meaning of s. 272 C.P.A.

[197] Since there are no contracts between the Petitioners and the Respondents, the former cannot recover either compensatory or punitive damages from the latter pursuant to the provisions of the CPA.

Le texte intégral du jugement est disponible ici: http://bit.ly/SKNX2N

Référence neutre: [2012] ABD 356

Autre décision citée dans le présent billet:

1. Richard v. Time Inc., 2012 CSC 8.